

# BETWEEN TWO HELLS

ALSO BY DIARMAID FERRITER

*The Border: The Legacy of a Century of Anglo-Irish Politics*

*On the Edge: Ireland's Offshore Islands: A Modern History*

*A Nation Not a Rabble: The Irish Revolution, 1913–23*

*Ambiguous Republic: Ireland in the 1970s*

*Occasions of Sin: Sex and Society in Modern Ireland*

*Judging Dev: A Reassessment of the Life and Legacy  
of Eamon de Valera*

*The Transformation of Ireland 1900–2000*

BETWEEN  
TWO HELLS

THE IRISH CIVIL WAR

DIARMAID FERRITER

P

PROFILE BOOKS

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by  
Profile Books Ltd  
29 Cloth Fair  
London  
EC1A 7JQ  
*www.profilebooks.com*

Copyright © Diarmaid Ferriter, 2021

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Typeset in Garamond by MacGuru Ltd  
Printed and bound in Great Britain by  
Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.

The moral right of the author has been asserted.

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the publisher of this book.

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978 1 78816 174 9  
eISBN 978 1 78283 510 3



Dedicated with love to my parents, Vera and Nollaig

## CONTENTS

Introduction: Faith, Reason and Betrayal	I
<b>Part One: The Course and Nature of the War</b>	15
1 'No one has ever defined a Republic'	17
2 The Ulster Rock	25
3 'Only putting off the evil way'	31
4 The Call to Arms	45
5 Lost Leaders	56
6 Raw Lads and the New Black and Tans	63
7 Escape Tunnels and Shit Buckets	74
8 God's Law and Joans of Arc	79
9 Public Safety	89
10 The Peasant Mind	98
11 Giving It to the Bastards	102
12 The Mind's Exhilaration	110
13 Fizzling Out	118
<b>Part Two: Afterlife and Legacy</b>	125
14 Potatoes, Water and Pensions	127
15 The Price of a Lost Life	136
16 Insulting the Dead	143
17 Broken Lives	154
18 The Uncertainty of a Soldier's Life	161
19 Ideal Specimens of Womanhood	175
20 Two Teeth	188

21	Poachers Turned Gamekeepers	196
22	Virtue and Erin, Saxon and Guilt	205
23	Sidestepping Differences	217
24	Codology	225
25	Blind Loyalty Eroded	232
26	Not Caring Who Did What	239
 <i>Notes</i>		245
<i>Bibliography</i>		296
<i>Acknowledgements</i>		311
<i>Index</i>		312

## INTRODUCTION: FAITH, REASON AND BETRAYAL

In September 1922, at the height of the Irish Civil War, Eamon de Valera sought to explain to a confidante, Mary MacSwiney, why he could not share her uncompromising republicanism:

Reason rather than faith has been my master ... I have felt for some time that this doctrine of mine ill fitted me to be leader of the republican party ... nature never fashioned me to be a partisan leader ... For the sake of the cause I allowed myself to be put into a position which it is impossible for one of my outlook and personal bias to fill with effect for the party ... every instinct of mine would indicate that I was meant to be a dyed-in-the-wool Tory, or even a Bishop, rather than the leader of a revolution.

De Valera was the president of Sinn Féin and the most high-profile figure to oppose the acceptance of a compromise Anglo-Irish Treaty with Britain that brought an end to the War of Independence and created a twenty-six-county free-state dominion rather than the desired Irish Republic. Yet he was clearly struggling to make common cause with those on the same side of the Treaty divide as him, but who 'keep on the plane of Faith and Unreason and maintain that position consciously'.<sup>1</sup>

As a conflict, the civil war was small-scale, but the rhetoric it generated was grandiose. Fought between two blocs of the republican movement over a treaty that had fairly broad public support, it was coloured by regional disparities, the creation of a new National

## *Between Two Hells*

Army by the leaders of the new pro-Treaty provisional government, and a recalcitrant Irish Republican Army (IRA), particularly strong in Munster and labelled the 'Irregulars' by its opponents, who were increasingly forced to rely on guerrilla tactics. As a military contest it was almost over by the end of 1922. Resulting in the region of 1,300 fatalities, it has garnered the labels 'Brother Against Brother' and 'Green Against Green.'<sup>2</sup> A century on from the war, however, those labels are inadequate; there were numerous shades of colour and men had no monopoly on the division. Neither is the faith/reason dichotomy satisfactory. While civil war opponents did much to contrive narratives that emphasised these contrasts, in reality the war was never as clear-cut as either side pretended or came to believe. In the words of writer George Russell (AE), both sides embraced 'the one-dimensional mind ... beaten by the hammer of Thor into some mould or shape when they cling to one idea.'<sup>3</sup> The challenge at its centenary is to discard that hammer to do justice to its various contours and colours.

De Valera's despondent words in 1922 seemed to suggest a vindication of the assertion earlier that year of his nemesis in London, Winston Churchill, secretary of state for the colonies and one of the negotiators of the Treaty, that 'Mr de Valera may gradually come to personify not a cause but a catastrophe'. He added ominously that the provisional government seeking to implement the Treaty 'must assert itself or perish and be replaced by some other form of control'.<sup>4</sup> It was a typical Churchillian bullying flourish communicated to Michael Collins, chair of the provisional government, the IRA intelligence master turned Anglo-Irish negotiator who had signed the Treaty with reluctance. It was also a reminder of the British shadow that hung over Ireland in 1922; that the civil war was not just an internal Irish matter. With the British-assisted attack on anti-Treaty IRA members in Dublin in June 1922 that began the civil war, was it Churchill's policy rather than an Irish policy that 'had effectively triumphed'?<sup>5</sup> And could the Irish general election that same month, during which pro-Treaty candidates prevailed, be seen as fair and free, given the lingering British pressure?

De Valera, Churchill and Collins were central to the gestation

*Introduction: Faith, Reason and Betrayal*

of Ireland's civil war; two of them not only survived this turbulent period but went on to achieve iconic status, seen by their supporters twenty years later when ensconced in power as representing the destiny of their respective nations. Collins, killed during the civil war at the age of thirty-one, became its most high-profile victim.

As Collins came into his own in the aftermath of the signing of the Treaty, de Valera experienced disdain both from anti-Treaty militants, who distrusted what they regarded as his moderation, and from his pro-Treaty opponents, who regarded him as dangerously subversive. It was this falling between stools that created the greatest dilemma of his sixty-year career in politics. While he could not or would not accept the Treaty, he was also, as evidenced by the MacSwiney letter, uncomfortable with the republican purists and was floundering. Ronan Fanning has suggested this was because, having been 'swaddled in the comfort blanket of four years of deference and obedience, de Valera tried to chart a course too subtle [suggesting, not Irish membership of the Commonwealth, but an 'external association' with it] to be understood by those less intellectually astute than he was.'<sup>6</sup>

Contemporaries were much less kind, seeing his opposition as solely about personal ambition and power rather than principle, placing the burden of compromise 'on his opponent's shoulders' – an unforgivable act with deadly consequences. It was deemed especially egregious from someone who had not even deigned to be involved, as the senior Sinn Féin leader, in the Treaty negotiations.<sup>7</sup>

Fanning's dismissal of de Valera's opponents is, however, too sweeping, implying a lack of depth and engagement with issues that most were deeply sincere about. Nor did anti-Treatyites have a monopoly on expressions of faith; the pro-Treaty IRA officer Michael Rynne recorded in his diary 'I support the Treaty from conviction ... I cannot retract my faith.' And that came at a personal cost: 'I stand to lose 50% of my friendships and 70% or so of my acquaintanceships.' At a dance in the Mansion House in March 1922, 'Cathal Brugha was there and I had to cut him [off] in no uncertain manner.'<sup>8</sup> Rynne grew weary of the sternness of those who 'adopt an air and tone of moral superiority to all lesser men.'<sup>9</sup> Brugha, who had been Sinn Féin

minister for defence, was shortly to lie dead. But that both sides were still dancing, if awkwardly, in early 1922 is a reminder that the first half of that year still held out the possibility of avoiding war.

The reasons put forward for accepting the Treaty – that it offered substantive independence and could be a pathway to even greater autonomy in the future, or was a pragmatic compromise in the face of a much more powerful Britain and an alternative to renewed war – were persuasive to many. Others, however, were adamant that Ireland's plight could not be addressed through contemporary realpolitik. Frank Gallagher, a trenchant opponent of the Treaty and an IRA Volunteer in Dublin, who spent decades after the civil war justifying the anti-Treaty side, insisted Ireland was not land or people: 'Ireland is something else ... Ireland is the dead and the things the dead would have done ... Ireland is spirit.'<sup>10</sup> Likewise, it was asserted by Todd Andrews, who fought with the anti-Treaty IRA as a teenager, that 'our Ireland had in fact become a political abstraction.'<sup>11</sup>

Todd's son, David, who went on to have a successful career with the political party Fianna Fáil, founded by anti-Treatyites in 1926, argued decades later that 'the civil war had little to do with ideology. The choice of sides in the war had, in most cases, little to do with politics. Often it had more to do with personality clashes, the manoeuvrings of cliques and the readiness of troops to follow individual leaders.' This assessment too, seems to place the participants outside of their time, as if they were automatons, but they felt deeply; Andrews quoted the Belfast Catholic Sinn Féiner and subsequent Fianna Fáil stalwart Seán MacEntee: 'this was one of those periods when emotion overthrows reason.'<sup>12</sup>

Reason, it seems, also became ruthless for those running the pro-Treaty government. Just over two weeks after de Valera wrote his letter to MacSwiney, the provisional government introduced a public safety bill making the bearing of arms against the state punishable by execution, to show, according to William T. Cosgrave, who replaced Collins as leader of the government, 'that there is a government prepared to take the responsibility of governing ... although I have always objected to the death penalty, there is no other way.'<sup>13</sup> The first executions took place on 17 November and there were to be

## *Introduction: Faith, Reason and Betrayal*

seventy-seven by the end of the civil war, or eighty-three, if four men executed for armed robbery and two summarily shot by firing squad in Cork and Kerry before the legislation was passed, are included.<sup>14</sup>

Pro-Treaty political leaders articulated justification for this policy by reference to the existential crisis the fledgling state faced and the insistence that they were protectors of democracy. It is a contention that has proved convincing to some historians, but others are more sceptical; if 1922 was essentially about the 'birth of democracy', why was there such failure to find a political solution in 1922? In any case, Irish democratic culture predated the Treaty, 'so the vista of a heroic elite forcing democratic values down the throat of a recalcitrant society should not be taken at face value'.<sup>15</sup>

The battle to control the labelling and narrative of the war began during it. Cosgrave was adamant as he faced into 1923 that the Irish civil war was no such thing: 'I may say to call this "civil war" is a libel on civil war.'<sup>16</sup> It was, as he saw it, about defeating criminals, not soldiers. Those passionately opposed to him also dismissed the civil war label for different reasons. Muriel MacSwiney, whose husband Terence was one of the best known martyrs of the Irish War of Independence, was in Washington in September 1922 to push the anti-Treaty case and insisted 'the fight in Ireland is not in reality a civil war. England has only persuaded some Irish to help her.'<sup>17</sup>

But civil war it was, given that it involved armed conflict between Irish citizens and within their communities, parishes and even families, and the 'rhetorical battles' regarding the concept of civil war should not overshadow that. True, civil war experiences can be self-servingly shaped and distorted 'through language and memory' and by the 'conceptual heritage of civil war', but they are 'first and foremost a category of experience'.<sup>18</sup> Nor can the violence of civil wars be reduced to irrationality or pre-existing cleavages; rather it carries its own logic and amounts to 'a joint process created by the actions of both political actors and civilians', while non-combatants are not always just pawns trapped between rebels and the state.<sup>19</sup> The violence of the Irish civil war was, however, small in scale compared with other contemporary civil wars. There was little balance of power from 1922 to 1923; the provisional government had the backing of vested and

‘moral interests’; republicans were beaten quickly because they had no proper military plan or enough public support. Partition, a reality since 1921 and which had created a six-county Northern Ireland to satisfy the demands of Ulster unionists opposed to an all-island Anglo-Irish settlement, ‘saved the south from the most explosive internal problems subverting new states.’<sup>20</sup> But violence also marred the birth of Northern Ireland, and with one-third of its population nationalist and opposed to its creation, the northern backdrop to the civil war was not just a sideshow but a parallel and deadly conflict: over 500 people were killed there between 1920 and 1922.

In 2007 Charles Townshend argued, ‘Ireland’s violence was constrained by social mechanisms we do not yet fully understand.’<sup>21</sup> The Finnish civil war, fought from January to May 1918, killed up to 36,000; the Estonian War of Independence from late 1918 to early 1920 killed just under 12,000; the parallel Latvian equivalent resulted in 13,000 fatalities and the 1919–21 Hungarian ‘red and white’ terror caused about 5,000 deaths. Ireland was well down the fatality league table.<sup>22</sup> As elucidated by Anne Dolan, however, such figures are only one measurement (‘a blunt and awkward instrument’); we need to be conscious of the nature as well as the extent of violence and also what Ireland had in common with other conflict zones as ‘Ireland’s wars came of the same mess of reasons found in every other place’. Perhaps also relevant was that Ireland was in a different ‘zone of violence’ and not part of the ‘culture of defeat’ after the First World War that prompted ‘ultra violence’ born of ethnic and religious tensions in other parts of Europe at that time.<sup>23</sup>

It might seem perverse to stress the need to factor in restraint in an analysis of the Irish civil war, given that we have got so used to quietly shaking our heads at its perceived viciousness, but a wider, comparative context suggests that might be required. Unlike in Ireland, a central question in the Finnish civil war was whether social justice should be prioritised over independence. In both countries,

divisions emerged over who could further the nation’s interests, but in Finland, these divisions had profound social dimensions.

The victors interpreted their civil war in national terms, as a war

## *Introduction: Faith, Reason and Betrayal*

of liberation (*Vapaussota*) against leftist forces contaminated by their exposure to the Soviet Union. The left, in contrast, interpreted the war in social terms.

Finland was also more vulnerable geopolitically considering Russia, which made reintegration of the losers imperative.<sup>24</sup> Ireland was perhaps not in as much danger of reoccupation by Britain, but when that was deemed a possibility during the Second World War, it was an emergency that generated consensus among civil war opponents.

What also needs to be remembered is that in ways other than violence 'the Irish civil war was fully as destructive as most of its kind.'<sup>25</sup> Liam de Róiste, Cork Sinn Féin TD (MP) and pro-Treaty, decried that its opponents did not rely upon 'moral weapons' but the republicans did claim a monopoly of moral right, complicated in October 1922 by a pastoral from the Irish Catholic Bishops that denounced violent anti-Treaty republicans and justified their excommunication.<sup>26</sup> Given that some republicans based their opposition to the Treaty on the notion of 'faith', interpreting their movement religiously as guardians of the 'soul' of the Irish nation, and were intent on claiming a spiritual authority for their movement that transcended episcopal authority, the Bishops' move created serious tension, resulting in an acrimonious battle of words.

What is indisputable is that (from the perspective of the government) the pastoral 'gave a cloak of moral authority' to the executions that followed.<sup>27</sup> But there was little moral consistency. As Cork writer Seán O'Faoláin, who was a member of the anti-Treaty IRA, characterised it, the 'slick slogan' of some clergy that civil war outrages were perpetrated by those who forgot God 'was to be mocked at by Catholic murder, Catholic gun-fire and Catholic torch setting flames to the houses of Catholic people.'<sup>28</sup>

The resort to hunger strikes by interned republicans was another notable development that defined the civil war. They were also spiritual for some; as Ernie O'Malley, the IRA's assistant chief of staff who endured a forty-one-day hunger strike, put it in November 1923, 'the country has not as yet had sufficient voluntary sacrifice and suffering and not until suffering fluctuates will she get back her real soul ...

There is not enough of spirituality in our movement.<sup>29</sup> Yet for all his ardent piety, O'Malley seemed incapable of or disinterested in defining 'people' or 'nation' or 'republic'.<sup>30</sup>

We need, nonetheless, to give sufficient weight to the emotional charge of 1922–3 and to 'bring the war back' to those who fought it, recognising that, in the words of Brian Hanley, 'any balanced discussion of terror in twentieth-century Ireland must identify all of its origins and agencies, not just those which conform to our own opinions and prejudices'.<sup>31</sup> Due to transformations in archival access, a growing interest in the depths of personal history and a weakening of the suffocation the more recent Troubles in Northern Ireland placed history writing under, we are much better placed to do emotion justice and be less judgemental. It is not the duty of the historian to 'lecture the people of the past on how they should have done better'.<sup>32</sup> The quest should be to understand and contextualise their positions, the lights that guided them and to humanise their dilemmas and the deadly consequences of their decisions, an approach that has been more apparent in some recent studies. David Fitzpatrick, the biographer of Harry Boland, killed in 1922 as an opponent of the Treaty, concluded Boland was 'at once a dictator, an elitist, a populist and a democrat ... whether we consider that he was driven by a laudable conviction in the inalienable rights of nations or a grotesque delusion, the sincerity of his struggle cannot be impugned'.<sup>33</sup>

Calton Younger did lecture the civil war's participants to an extent in his 1968 book *Ireland's Civil War*, in which he noted just how difficult it was to be specific about the causes of the war but was nonetheless clear that 'the Irish civil war ought to have been fought with words on the floor of the Dáil [the Irish Parliament] and it could have been'.<sup>34</sup> Perhaps it could have been in a fantasy post-Treaty Ireland, where the Dáil was the prime national and final arbiter, but that regard did not exist in 1922. Younger's account was regarded as favouring the pro-Treaty side. Eoin Neeson, too, in 1966, though clearly sympathetic to the anti-Treatyites, was of the view that nothing was achieved by the civil war that could not have been achieved by negotiation, though his book was at its strongest in describing the military engagements.<sup>35</sup>

Michael Hopkinson observed in his book *Green Against Green* in 1988 that 'it is hardly surprising that a bitter incestuous conflict in a small country, which saw neither compromise nor reconciliation at its end, has been extremely difficult for Irish historians to write about in a detached manner'.<sup>36</sup> Hopkinson also wrote of the difficulty of describing 'chaos. The war had an ill-defined beginning and end; the fighting was erratic, extremely confusing and highly regionalised'.<sup>37</sup> I have left the intense minutiae of military combat to others better equipped, but chaos had many forms in Ireland in 1922–3, and for far too many the civil war's afterlife was also cruelly disordered, a fracturing discussed in detail in the second half of this book. The conflict also spawned an acerbic civil war politics, 'that infused every part of it with such intensity that some parts of the country are uncomfortable with the memory of it still. Without taking full account of its bitterness it is questionable whether one can begin to understand the Irish civil war at all'.<sup>38</sup>

It is difficult to dispute the assertion of Charles Townshend that republicans during the civil war had a view of public opinion that 'was and remained generally dismissive'. While some gloried in it, the anti-Treaty republicans were faced with stark impediments; not just public opinion, but also the fact that 'there was no plan of campaign'.<sup>39</sup> But those who opposed them were well capable too of contemptuous disregard for the depth and sincerity of anti-Treaty sentiment.

Some young minds swayed during the conflict. Another Cork writer, Frank O'Connor, initially trenchant, became disgusted by the end of it and came to decry those who insisted 'the Irish Republic was still in existence and would remain so, despite what its citizens might think'.<sup>40</sup> Others, like the playwright Lady Gregory, found themselves with a foot in both camps; she told a priest after the end of the civil war: 'one should not be more angry with government or Republicans than with different sections of one's own mind, tilting to good or bad on one or the other side'.<sup>41</sup> Patriotism was both an expensive currency and a contested, confused concept in Ireland in 1922, and no side had a monopoly of it.

Female republicans generated some of the most heated rhetoric and ferocious responses during the conflict. Attitudes to republican

women who endured great harshness dripped with contempt as the 'Furies' provoked a barely concealed misogyny.<sup>42</sup> These women were 'the women in men's clothing', as J. J. Walsh, a pro-Treaty minister, characterised them.<sup>43</sup> Warming to the culture of disparagement, the minister for home affairs (later justice), Kevin O'Higgins, referred to 'hysterical young women who ought to be playing five fingered exercises or helping their mothers with the brasses'.<sup>44</sup> While the Catholic Bishops decried 'decent' Irish boys who had 'degenerated' by taking up arms against the new state, the women who rejected that state were frequently dehumanised.

Yet others were neutral or indifferent, and some sympathies were kept secret or quiet amidst the cacophony of polarising rhetoric. Consider, for example, veterans of the 1916 Rising; of 572 people identified as active with the General Post Office garrison, where the rebels had their headquarters, the largest single portion, 41 per cent, were neutral during the civil war.<sup>45</sup> Liam de Róiste recorded in his diary in November 1922 that 'for the one person who is actively engaged in politics there are a hundred more who are only passively interested'.<sup>46</sup> There were numerous civil society organisations active in peace efforts and a Neutral IRA association established in December 1922, but there was also much evidence of tortured minds. Speaking in the Dáil in December 1921, P. J. Moloney, a Tipperary Sinn Féin TD and pharmacist who had come through a twenty-three-day hunger strike, the death of one of his IRA sons and the destruction of his home and business during the War of Independence, said simply 'we have been manoeuvred into a position where we have to choose between two hells'.<sup>47</sup>

Moloney opposed the Treaty and was to endure more hell – his two surviving sons continued to fight with the IRA and one of them was badly wounded – but then he opted out of politics in 1923, a move that 'most likely reflected not profound disillusionment, but the need to concentrate on rebuilding his life and business'.<sup>48</sup> Many, of course, had no commercial life to return to, yet while there were class dimensions to the polarisations of this period, and land hunger was a constant, there was no definite pattern relating support for the Treaty to class. Analysis of the TDs elected to the Dáil in 1918 or

1921 ‘disclose no significant distinguishing economic, social or familial factor that might explain the Treaty stance of individual TDs.’<sup>49</sup> There was still much tuppence halfpenny looking down on tuppence, however, and while some rebels liked to boast of their ‘practical socialism ... poverty was only a political virtue when it was respectable’, and the ‘most glaring omission from the Dáil’s membership was unskilled workers’. There were few references to class issues in the Treaty debate and the TDs were ‘broadly representative of the upwardly mobile Catholic middle class but not of the mass of the population.’<sup>50</sup>

Many responses to post civil-war Ireland were ‘both scathing and despairing’. As he faced death in the 1950s, Ernie O’Malley recorded that the British were no longer his enemies: ‘each man finds his enemy within himself.’<sup>51</sup> This underlines that freedom had different meanings. The new state did not enshrine many of the ideals or objectives of the revolution but what did that mean in practice for the civil war generation and the afterlives of the rank-and-file soldiers who fought? We have more information than ever before on what they did and endured during the civil war and for those who survived it, how they fared in its aftermath, particularly because of the opening of the Military Service Pensions archive and the extensively documented post-war battles for status, recognition and material survival. There is a raw and exceptional intimacy on display in many of these files relating to claims for pensions, and historians are now in a position to investigate one of the underwritten themes of the civil war: personal trauma, both internalised and externalised, and its long, long reach.

The archive is also a reminder of luck and station in life: ‘some of us were willing to throw up our employment when the call for recruits to the National Army came; they are now to be allowed to walk about without a penny to earn. Others were lucky to get back to their previous employment.’<sup>52</sup> The assertion of Fianna Fáil TD Oscar Traynor in 1935 that ‘the man with the right [pension] claim will justify it and the other people will be unable to justify it’ was far too neat and dismissive.<sup>53</sup> Michael D. Higgins, elected president of Ireland in 2011 and again in 2018, was far from alone in articulating a sense of betrayal. His father John applied unsuccessfully for a

*Between Two Hells*

pension in 1934 and had to wait until a 1949 Act for an appeal process before being awarded a pension in 1956. Interned for almost all of 1923, he had been employed as a grocer's assistant earning £180 a year but on his release his employer refused to accept him back 'with the result that I was idle until 1 August 1924 when I got a position as junior assistant ... at a salary of £50 per year indoor. At the time very few people would employ an ex-internee.'<sup>54</sup> The indignity was compounded by the pension delay, just part of a disillusionment that led to his son angrily decrying in poetry

all that had in recent years  
Befallen you.  
All week I waited to visit you  
But when I called, you had been moved  
To where those dying too slowly  
Were sent,  
A poorhouse, no longer known by that name ...  
Long before that, you had slept,  
In ditches and dug-outs,  
Prayed in terror at ambushes  
With others who later debated  
Whether De Valera was lucky or brilliant ...  
Your eyes when you looked at me  
Were a thousand miles away.  
Now totally broken,  
Unlike those times even  
Of rejection, when you went at sixty  
For jobs you never got ...  
And all these things have been scraped  
In my heart,  
And I can never hope to forget  
What was, after all,  
A betrayal.<sup>55</sup>

As W. B. Yeats had recognised in 1923 'the country will not always be an uncomfortable place for a country gentleman to live in.'<sup>56</sup> But

for those without a stake since they had ‘taken the loser’s side’, a bleakness expanded and calcified.

Emigration was an inevitable consequence. Correspondence in 1935 in relation to a civil war Cork IRA brigade, for example, reveals that of thirty-five Volunteers who had been involved in an attack in Skibbereen in July 1922, eight were in the USA.<sup>57</sup> The widow of Patrick Doyle, a National Army soldier who fell from a lorry and developed fatal pneumonia in August 1923, told the military pensions administrators in 1928 that she was leaving the country for New York: ‘I am leaving my child in charge of my mother.’<sup>58</sup>

Silence was also a legacy, and it was not necessarily ignoble. Despite his unashamedly tribal approach to civil war politics Seán Lemass, a young anti-Treaty IRA member in 1922 who eventually became Taoiseach in 1959, was determinedly mute about what had happened, including the sordid killing and mutilation of his brother Noel after the end of the civil war. Wary about commemorative flag waving, when asked about the civil war by journalist Michael Mills in 1969, he uncharacteristically welled up: ‘Terrible things were done by both sides,’ he finally said; ‘I’d prefer not to talk about it.’<sup>59</sup> He was certainly correct in his assertion about joint responsibilities and as for the preference for silence, that was shared by many of his generation. But it is a conversation that should be opened up with the centenary of the civil war. It is also possible now to look at another controversial civil war legacy, the threatened mutiny in the army in 1924, as in 2019 the Department of Defence opened the files relating to the resultant inquiry that had been locked up for ninety-five years.

In 1924 Kevin O’Higgins, the Free State’s minister for justice, addressing an audience at Oxford University, asked them to ‘remember what a weird composite of idealism, neurosis, megalomania and criminality is apt to be thrown to the surface in even the best regulated revolution.’<sup>60</sup> His words underlined how skewed or selective versions of the civil war were being shaped from the outset, as were caricatures. O’Higgins was correct about the cocktail of vanity and brutality, but there were many other ingredients in the ‘weird composite’ – if it was weird at all – including sincerity, devoutness, despair, crushing sadness and poverty, elements elided in O’Higgins’s

*Between Two Hells*

determination to dehumanise his opponents by referring to their supposed 'savage, primitive passion'. William O'Brien, the austere labour leader and trade unionist, a TD in 1922–3 who accepted the Treaty, was also moved to melodramatic pronouncement in the aftermath of the civil war: 'the lack of magnanimity on the winning side and the criminal desperation of the losers constitutes a page of history which no unbiased Irishman can read without aching eyes and cheeks of shame'.<sup>61</sup> Such a regretful tone was understandable and deeply felt, but what mattered to the participants, and what should matter to historians, is what was felt at the time.

## CHAPTER ONE

# ‘NO ONE HAS EVER DEFINED A REPUBLIC’

While the split in Sinn Féin was the dramatic and arresting Irish political story of 1922, the rupture was born of older problems. The challenge after the 1916 Rising in building Sinn Féin as a national movement was the need for ‘the balancing of old and new’ in the Sinn Féin hierarchy to include those who had opposed the Rising, during which 504 people died. While Sinn Féin delegates at the party’s national gathering in Dublin in 1917 agreed to commit themselves to creating a republic, it was maintained that, once that objective had been achieved, the people would be free to decide on the form of government they wanted. This was an attempt to reassure the moderates, one of whom, Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Féin, who did not take part in the Rising, ceded the leadership to Eamon de Valera, a commandant of one of the fighting forces during the rebellion. Fr Michael O’Flanagan, elected joint vice-president of Sinn Féin at that stage, was later keen to stress that ‘the split was there from the start.’<sup>1</sup>

Historian Eoin MacNeill, who as chief of staff of the Irish Volunteers had tried to prevent the Rising, was also elected to the executive of the party in 1917. He was a ‘republican bugbear’, whom Michael Collins in 1917 wanted to see issuing a statement ‘saying that he intends devoting himself solely to literature’. But there were, nonetheless, quite a few ‘MacNeillites’, and he received the highest number of votes in the election of members to the executive.<sup>2</sup> There was also room, however, for some of his strongest critics, including Constance Markievicz, the most high-profile female rebel, who had wanted MacNeill shot in 1916 for his perceived treachery.<sup>3</sup>

## *Between Two Hells*

Between 1917 and 1921, 2,141 lives were lost in Ireland as a result of political violence; the War of Independence was fought between the IRA and British Crown forces between January 1919 and July 1921, when both sides accepted neither could inflict decisive defeat and agreed a truce. The same month Jan Smuts, prime minister of the South African Union, a self-governing dominion of the British Empire, was in London on imperial business. Part of his mission was to try to persuade de Valera to accept dominion status for Ireland within the Empire rather than insist on an Irish republic. De Valera claimed such a question was for the Irish people to decide and Smuts tellingly responded: 'The British people will never give you this choice. You are next door to them ... to you, the Republic is the true expression of national self-determination. But it is not the only expression.'<sup>4</sup>

This correspondence presaged what was to become a major controversy surrounding the Anglo-Irish treaty negotiated in 1921 between a Sinn Féin delegation and their British government counterparts led by prime minister David Lloyd George and including colonial secretary Winston Churchill, lord privy seal Austen Chamberlain and lord chancellor Birkenhead, from October to early December.

De Valera, however, refused to partake in the negotiations; to be uncontaminated by them, it seemed, would secure his position as symbol of the Republic, or one to rally the people in the event of resistance, or to act as a kind of 'final court of appeal to avert whatever Britain might attempt to pull over'.<sup>5</sup> He justified his selection of the Irish negotiating team (or plenipotentiaries, to give them their official title) on the basis that his choices, especially Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith, supposedly representing militants and moderates respectively, 'would form a well balanced team'.<sup>6</sup> But he also had his own 'external association' or 'Document no. 2' proposal, by which Ireland would be an independent country with a constitution stipulating that the source of all authority rested with the Irish people. Ireland would associate with the Commonwealth for defence purposes ('matters of common concern') and recognise the Crown as 'external' head of that Commonwealth. Yet he acknowledged

*'No one has ever defined a Republic'*

he knew such proposals would probably be 'unacceptable to those whose political upbringing had been based on "separatism"'.<sup>7</sup> What precisely 'separatism' meant was not clear, and deliberate vagueness was also tactical; after all, Collins, in refusing to articulate a bottom line, had admitted to American journalist Carl Ackerman in 1920 'no one has ever defined a republic'.<sup>8</sup>

The British were, in the words of Lloyd George 'after a settlement – that was our objective'. They were particularly preoccupied with Empire, Crown and defence, but there was still an ambiguity as to what proposed dominion status for Ireland meant. The Irish delegation was, according to Michael Laffan, 'badly briefed'; in particular the negotiations were already under way 'before de Valera revealed to Griffith what his policy on the Ulster question should be'. This policy was that Ulster constituencies should be able to choose if they wanted to be ruled from Dublin and those in favour of remaining under Belfast rule could stay under the Northern Ireland Parliament, formally established in June 1921, which would be subordinate to a Dublin Parliament; what was regarded as 'essential unity' for Ireland.<sup>9</sup>

The Irish delegation was outmanoeuvred by the British in relation to a Boundary Commission clause in the Treaty, which they were led to believe would result in an alteration to the border, making the state of Northern Ireland unviable. They were deceived on that issue, not helped by their own naivety, but overall, the Irish delegates negotiated a measure of independence that some more than others believed was substantial: a dominion under the title Irish Free State (*Saorstát*). The contentious issues that came up for discussion during the negotiations included recognition of the right of Northern Ireland to self-government, a British military presence in Ireland and, most distressingly, the oath of allegiance to the British Crown to be taken by members of an Irish Parliament. Lloyd George threatened a swift resumption of 'immediate and terrible war ... within three days' if the Treaty was not signed.<sup>10</sup>

His bluff, if that is what it was, was not called. After a tortuous meeting at their headquarters, the Irish delegation signed the eighteen-article Treaty on 6 December, and in doing so not only formally reached a historic Anglo-Irish compromise, but also set the scene for

a fatal division of the Irish republican movement. By 8 December, when the Sinn Féin cabinet met to discuss the Treaty, these differences could not be papered over. The controversy over the Treaty came to expose 'previously buried fault lines of ideology, political temperament and social outlook within Sinn Féin and also aggravated long-simmering personal and factional tensions within its leaders and activists' to the extent that 'Free Stater' and 'Republican' became pejorative terms, though that did not mean they represented a coherent ideology.<sup>11</sup> The cabinet split four to three in favour of the Treaty. Six days later the acrimonious debate on the Treaty began in the Dáil.

Christmas 1921 brought home to many just what was at stake, amplified by vocal Catholic Church support for the Treaty; the foundation of a new state for some of the Bishops would be the equivalent of 'the reaching of dry ground again' after the tumultuous War of Independence.<sup>12</sup> Cardinal Michael Logue, Catholic primate of all Ireland, suggested that opponents of the treaty did nothing but 'talk and wrangle for days about their shadowy republic and their obligations to it'. Logue insisted the Treaty granted everything that was necessary for the progress and welfare of the country.<sup>13</sup> Nor was public or media opinion with the anti-Treaty side; a survey of newspapers reveals that 'only the *Connachtman* in Sligo, the *Donegal Vindicator* and the *Waterford News* took an explicit anti-Treaty position in 1921'. Meanwhile, the *Kilkenny People* declared in hope that 'Ireland is too small for civil war'.<sup>14</sup>

Pro-Treaty TDs referred to it being 'the best rock from which to jump off for the final accomplishment of the Irish freedom', and their responsibility not to cause renewed war owing to their 'duty to the civil population', and that the contested oath would be to the Free State's constitution rather than the British Crown. It was not, maintained Collins, about whether 'the dead men would approve of it' but 'whether the living approve of it'.<sup>15</sup>

Some opponents of the Treaty maintained they were not republican 'doctrinaires' but believed in 'complete independence' from Britain; others focused on betrayal of the dead, the idea that the 'nation state' would be incomplete without Northern Ireland, and

*'No one has ever defined a Republic'*

British retention of three garrisoned Irish naval ports.<sup>16</sup> One of the key arguments of de Valera was that a Treaty signed under duress could not be binding; others cried slavery and coercion and abhorrence of the oath of allegiance.<sup>17</sup> There were six women TDs, all of whom voted against, and they were not just mouthpieces for the dead: as one of them, Ada English, a doctor imprisoned during the War of Independence, asserted, 'I have no dead men to throw in my teeth as a reason for holding the opinions I hold.'<sup>18</sup> Batt O'Connor, who was close to Collins, referred to the women 'mudslinging and name calling and spitting and frothing to the mouth like angry cats ... I think the Irish people will not be in a hurry again to elect women to represent them.'<sup>19</sup>

There was a parallel flurry of resolutions in favour of accepting the Treaty from local authorities, but ominously, the largest IRA division in the country, in Cork, rejected the treaty before the parliamentary vote and estimates suggest that nationally, up to 75 per cent of IRA members opposed it, though not all of them would take up arms against it. On paper, the IRA had a national membership of 112,650 in the autumn of 1921 and there was much incredulity within its ranks about the signing of the Treaty; it had not been prepared for compromise and local units had not been kept informed enough of what was going on in London. In any case, some IRA members regarded politics as moribund or irrelevant and saw themselves as 'in charge'. In historian Peter Hart's words, 'the guerrillas thought of themselves as sovereign ... they had brought the republic into being ... nobody else had the right to give it away.'<sup>20</sup> If the Dáil was going to jettison that declared republic, the IRA was not required to be answerable to it and, as Liam Lynch, a senior IRA commandant and soon to be chief of staff of the anti-Treaty IRA, stated emphatically, 'the army had to hew the way to freedom for politics to follow.'<sup>21</sup>

Frank Aiken, commandant of the 4th Northern Division of the IRA, suggested to Lynch an alternative: 'that he could do more for the Republic by propaganda than by fighting men of the old army'. According to Michael Fearon, also of the 4th Northern Division, Aiken had a preference for 'an ordered state of government', in the South so 'we could attack the north, with a chance of getting a

united Ireland which was always the immediate job to us as northerners'.<sup>22</sup> But the lack of a coherent strategy was in some ways a more pronounced version of difficulties apparent during the War of Independence including limits to the control exercised by GHQ and the assertion of local autonomy, especially in Cork and Tipperary.

An informal meeting at the house of Seán T. O'Kelly, chief-whip to the anti-Treaty TDs in the Dáil, on 4 January 1922 was attended by both sides 'with a view to avoiding a split and dissipation of forces in the Dáil, the army and the country'. It was suggested that, if the Dáil endorsed the Treaty, 'the active services of president de Valera should be preserved for the nation. In this way every ounce can be got out of the Treaty.' A new provisional government, the nonsensical argument went, tolerated by a continuing Dáil from which it derived its powers, could operate and the army would remain as one, under the control of the provisional government and 'responsible to the Dáil'. O'Kelly maintained that Collins and Griffith agreed to this but de Valera 'at once turned down the proposals' and the others in turn spurned it.<sup>23</sup>

In London, Tom Jones, secretary to prime minister Lloyd George, wrongly predicted a vote in the Dáil in favour of the Treaty at seventy-five to forty-five against, while Andy Cope, the British civil servant who from the end of 1920 had been intensely involved in peace efforts and who was to remain in Dublin as the senior British civil servant until October 1922, forecast a 'landslide'.<sup>24</sup> When TDs voted on the Treaty on 7 January 1922 the result was sixty-four in favour and fifty-seven against ('rejection or ratification, they are both prongs of a devil's fork' noted Michael Rynne in his diary)<sup>25</sup>. De Valera resigned as president of the Dáil two days later to be replaced by Griffith, a reversal of the roles from October 1917.

Michael Collins chaired the provisional government appointed on 14 January to oversee the implementation of the Treaty; it also had to draft a constitution for the new state while, bizarrely, temporarily existing in tandem with a Dáil government led by Griffith, which was to fade away by April. Anti-Treatyites would not accept that the provisional government had legitimacy or had replaced the Dáil government. On 16 January the Lord Lieutenant, Viscount Fitz-Alan (Edmund Talbot), led British troops out of Dublin Castle, the

*'No one has ever defined a Republic'*

historic seat of British power in Ireland. For Collins, this was 'the high point' of his career and was determinedly presented as a 'surrender', though 'the reality was much trickier' as legally the transfer involved 'devolution of authority by the Crown'.<sup>26</sup> Nonetheless, symbolically, it packed a punch. In Athlone, Seán Mac Eoin, who had commanded the North Longford IRA's flying column and was now pro-Treaty, heralded the taking over of Athlone Barracks by the pro-Treaty IRA with a celebratory banquet and a speech entitled 'From Khaki to Green'.<sup>27</sup> Whatever optimism and sense of tangible benefits the Treaty generated, however, were tempered by the 2nd Southern Division of the IRA renouncing the authority of the Dáil and declaring itself independent of IRA headquarters.

Richard Mulcahy, who had commanded the IRA during the War of Independence and was now pro-Treaty, sought a third way: a council 'to frame definite proposals for associating the IRA with the government elected by the Irish people', which fell flat. He then, much to the chagrin of Griffith, decided to call an army convention, which he paradoxically declared he did not want but urged the Dáil to allow.<sup>28</sup> The cabinet overruled this and Mulcahy tried to pretend in vain that the crisis would pass and 'the fundamental unity of the army will reassert itself'.<sup>29</sup> The following month, the growing disdain for politics was sharply expressed, ironically, in Parliament: 'the army is not concerned with majorities or minorities' declared Galway TD Liam Mellows, but 'with a question of honour, a question of principle and a question of right'.<sup>30</sup>

The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), dating from 1858 and traditionally dedicated to a fully independent Irish republic through conspiracy and rebellion, also had a strong influence over the IRA and Sinn Féin, and there was overlapping membership between the three. It too, was split by the Treaty and ultimately 'disintegration was the result', but there was a parallel desire to use it as a mediating force during the civil war along with the hope by some members that it could be reorganised for their own purposes, whether pro- or anti-Treaty.<sup>31</sup> The female auxiliary of the IRA, Cumann na mBan, was also riven; at its convention in February of 482 delegates, 86 per cent were opposed to the Treaty. They remained a very public face

*Between Two Hells*

and voice of implacable opposition as well as orchestrating protests against imprisonments; indeed, with over 12,000 Cumann na mBan members supporting the anti-Treaty side, ‘much of the republican apparatus was run by women.’<sup>32</sup>

## NOTES

### Introduction: Faith, Reason and Betrayal

- 1 University College Dublin Archives (UCDA), Papers of Eamon de Valera, P150/1657, de Valera to Mary MacSwiney, 11 September 1922.
- 2 Liam Deasy, *Brother Against Brother* (Cork, 1982); Michael Hopkinson, *Green Against Green: The Irish Civil War* (Dublin, 1988).
- 3 Monk Gibbon (ed.), *The Living Torch: AE* (London, 1937), p. 191.
- 4 National Archives of Ireland (NAI), Department of Taoiseach (DT), S1322, Winston Churchill to Michael Collins, 12 April 1922.
- 5 Paul Bew, *Churchill and Ireland* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 113–31.
- 6 Ronan Fanning, *Eamon de Valera: A Will to Power* (London, 2015), p. 127.
- 7 Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, ‘The Man They Could Never Forgive: The View of the Opposition: Eamon de Valera and the Civil War’, in Joseph O’Carroll and John A. Murphy (eds.), *De Valera and His Times* (Cork, 1986), pp. 92–100.
- 8 National University of Ireland Galway Archives (NUIGA), Papers of Michael Rynne, P133/4/7/23, ‘Extracts from Journal 1922’, 18 January 1922, 13 March and 2 July 1922.
- 9 *Ibid.*, P133/4/7/11, Rynne to ‘M’, 12 May 1922.
- 10 Frank Gallagher, *Days of Fear* (Cork, 1967), p. 41.
- 11 Charles Townshend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence, 1918–1923* (London, 2013), p. 19.
- 12 David Andrews, ‘Collins has more in common with Fianna Fáil ideals’, *Irish Times*, 18 August 2001.
- 13 Michael Laffan, *Judging W. T. Cosgrave: The Foundation of the Irish State* (Dublin, 2014), pp. 120–21.
- 14 Seán Enright, *The Irish Civil War: Law, Execution and Atrocity* (Dublin, 2019), p. 120.
- 15 Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War* (Oxford, 2005), p. 97.

*Between Two Hells*

- 16 NAI, DT S1369/12, unsent letter of W. T. Cosgrave to Rev. R. Ayres, Holy Cross Prison, Tralee, 1 January 1923.
- 17 UCDA, Papers of Desmond FitzGerald, P80/287(3), 'Muriel MacSwiney in Washington, September 1922.'
- 18 David Armitage, *Civil Wars: A History in Ideas* (New York, 2018), pp. 238–9.
- 19 Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York, 2005), p. 209.
- 20 J. J. Lee, *Ireland 1912–1985: Politics and Society* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 77.
- 21 Townshend, *The Republic*, p. 452.
- 22 Anne Dolan, 'Killing in "the Good Old Irish Fashion"? Irish Revolutionary Violence in Context', *Irish Historical Studies*, 44(165), May 2020, pp. 11–25.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Bill Kissane, 'On the Shock of Civil War: Cultural Trauma and National Identity in Finland and Ireland', in *Nations and Nationalism: Journal for the Association of the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 26(1), June 2020, pp. 22–43.
- 25 Townshend, *The Republic*, p. 452.
- 26 Cork City and County Archives (CCCA), U271/A/47, De Róiste diaries, 18 April 1923.
- 27 Patrick Murray, *Oracles of God: The Roman Catholic Church and Irish Politics, 1922–37* (Dublin, 2000), p. 83.
- 28 Seán O'Faoláin, *Inishfallen: Fare Thee Well* (London, 1949), pp. 89–90.
- 29 Richard English and Cormac K. H. O'Malley (eds.), *Prisoners: The Civil War Letters of Ernie O'Malley* (Dublin 1991), Ernie O'Malley to Molly Childers, 23 November 1923.
- 30 Anne Dolan, 'The Papers in Context', in Cormac K. H. O'Malley and Anne Dolan (eds.), *No Surrender Here! The Civil War Papers of Ernie O'Malley, 1922–1924* (Dublin, 2007), pp. xliii–liiii.
- 31 Ibid., and Brian Hanley, 'Terror in Twentieth-Century Ireland', in David Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Terror in Ireland, 1916–1923* (Dublin, 2012), pp. 10–26.
- 32 Richard J. Evans, *Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History* (London, 2014), p. 30.
- 33 R. F. Foster, *Vivid Faces: The Revolutionary Generation in Ireland, 1890–1923* (London, 2014) and David Fitzpatrick, *Harry Boland's Irish Revolution* (Cork, 2003), pp. 326–7.
- 34 Calton Younger, *Ireland's Civil War* (London, 1968), p. 506.
- 35 Eoin Neeson, *The Civil War in Ireland* (Cork, 1966).
- 36 Hopkinson, *Green Against Green*, p. xii.

## Notes

- 37 Ibid.
- 38 Anne Dolan, review of Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, in *Reviews in History*, March 2006, [www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/502](http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/502), accessed 21 January 2019.
- 39 Townshend, *The Republic*, p. 359.
- 40 Frank O'Connor, *An Only Child* (London, 1961), pp. 256–7.
- 41 Lennox Robinson (ed.), *Lady Gregory's Journals, 1916–1930* (London, 1946), entry for 12 December 1923, pp. 195–6.
- 42 Leeann Lane, *Dorothy Macardle* (Dublin, 2019), p. 183.
- 43 Margaret Ward, *Unmanageable Revolutionaries: Women and Irish Nationalism* (London, 1995), p. 176.
- 44 Ibid., p. 192.
- 45 Jimmy Wren, *The GPO Garrison Easter Week 1916: A Biographical Dictionary* (Dublin, 2015), pp. 389, 410–11.
- 46 CCCA, U271/A/147, De Róiste diaries, 10 November 1922.
- 47 Eunan O'Halpin and Mary Staines, “Between Two Hells”: The Social, Political and Military Backgrounds and Motivations of the 121 TDs Who Voted for or Against the Anglo-Irish Treaty in January 1922’, in Liam Weeks and Micheál Ó Fathartaigh (eds.), *The Treaty: Debating and Establishing the Irish State* (Dublin, 2018), pp. 73–83.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Peter Hart, *The IRA and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916–1923* (London, 1998), p. 147, and Brian Hanley, “Merely Tuppence Half-Penny Looking down on Tuppence?”: Class, the Second Dáil and Irish Republicanism’, in Weeks and Ó Fathartaigh, *The Treaty*, pp. 60–70.
- 51 Foster, *Vivid Faces*, p. 311.
- 52 Irish Military Archives (IMA), Military Service Pensions Collection (MSPC), Administration Files, SP G/10, Eddie McAteer to Army Pensions Board (APB) on behalf of Ex-IRA National Army men of Monaghan Town, 25 May 1926. Correspondence concerning pensions was also variously addressed to the ‘Army Pensions Branch’, the Department of Defence and/or the ‘Army Pensions Department’. For the sake of economy, APB has been used throughout.
- 53 IMA, MSPC, MSP 34 REF 236, Oscar Traynor: evidence of 18 January 1935.
- 54 IMA, MSPC, MSP 34 REF 12617, John Higgins: pension application, 18 April 1935.
- 55 Michael D. Higgins, *The Betrayal* (Dublin, 1990), pp. 7–10.

*Between Two Hells*

- 56 Donald R. Pearce, *The Senate Speeches of W. B. Yeats* (London, 2001), Debate on Damage to Property Bill, 28 March 1923, pp. 25–6.
- 57 IMA, MSPC, Brigade Activity Reports (BAR)/A/A, 1 Cork Brigade: Michael Leahy to Office of the Referee (OR), 25 September 1935.
- 58 IMA, MSPC, W5D 77, Patrick Doyle: Bridget Doyle to APB, 18 September 1928.
- 59 John Horgan, *Seán Lemass: The Enigmatic Patriot* (Dublin, 1997), p. 28.
- 60 Kevin O’Higgins, *Three Years Hard Labour: An Address Delivered to the Irish Society at Oxford University* (Oxford, 1924).
- 61 Kissane, *Politics*, p. 65.

**1: ‘No one has ever defined a Republic’**

- 1 Townshend, *The Republic*, p. 24.
- 2 Peter Hart, *Mick: The Real Michael Collins* (London, 2005), pp. 138, 155.
- 3 Diarmaid Ferriter, *A Nation and not a Rabble: The Irish Revolution, 1913–1923* (London, 2015), p. 154.
- 4 NAI, Dáil Éireann Files (DE) 2/262, Jan Smuts to de Valera, 16 July 1921.
- 5 Diarmaid Ferriter, *Judging Dev: A Reassessment of the Life and Legacy of Eamon de Valera* (Dublin, 2007), pp. 61–99.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Michael Laffan, *The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916–1923* (Cambridge 1999), pp. 346ff.
- 8 Hart, *Mick*, p. 293.
- 9 Laffan, *Resurrection of Ireland*, pp. 346–86.
- 10 Francis Costello ‘Lloyd George and Ireland 1919–21: An Uncertain Policy’, *Canadian Journal of Irish Studies*, 14(1), July 1988, pp. 5–16.
- 11 Gavin Foster, ‘Res Publica na hÉireann? Republican Liberty and the Irish Civil War’, *New Hibernia Review*, 16(3), Autumn 2012, pp. 20–42.
- 12 Brian Heffernan, *Freedom and the Fifth Commandment: Catholic Priests and Political Violence in Ireland, 1919–21* (Manchester, 2014), pp. 240–46.
- 13 Murray, *Oracles of God*, p. 49.
- 14 Donal Ó Drisceoil, ‘Irish Newspapers, the Treaty and the Civil War’, in John Crowley, Donal Ó Drisceoil and Mike Murphy (eds.), *Atlas of the Irish Revolution* (Cork, 2017), pp. 661–5.
- 15 Mel Farrell, ‘“Stepping Stone to Freedom”: Pro-Treaty Rhetoric and Strategy During the Treaty Debates’, in Weeks and Ó Fathartaigh, *The Treaty*, pp. 18–32.
- 16 John Dorney, ‘Republican Representations of the Treaty: “A Usurpation Pure and Simple”’, in Weeks and Ó Fathartaigh, *The Treaty*, pp. 46–59.

## Notes

- 17 Foster, 'Res Publica'.
- 18 Sinéad McCool, 'Debating Not Negotiating: The Female TDs of the Second Dáil', in Weeks and Ó Fathartaigh, *The Treaty*, pp. 85–96.
- 19 Jason Knirck, 'Women's Political Rhetoric and the Irish Revolution', in Thomas Hachey (ed.), *Turning Points in Twentieth Century Irish History* (Dublin, 2011), pp. 39–56.
- 20 Michael Farry, *The Aftermath of Revolution: Sligo, 1921–23* (Dublin, 2000), pp. 11–35 and Hart, *IRA and Its Enemies*, p. 269.
- 21 Meda Ryan, *The Real Chief: The Story of Liam Lynch* (Cork, 1986), p. 9.
- 22 IMA, MSPC, BAR/A/51/2, 1st Brigade, 4th Northern Division: account of Michael J. Fearon, 6 May 1940, including Aiken memorandum from 17 July 1922.
- 23 UCDA, Papers of Ernest Blythe, P24/43, Report of informal meeting at house of Seán T. O'Kelly, 4 January 1922.
- 24 Parliamentary Archives, Westminster, London (PAW), Papers of David Lloyd George, LG/F/184/3/4, note of Tom Jones to Lloyd George, 2 January 1922, and LG/F/184/3/5, telegram of Andy Cope to Irish Office, n.d., early January 1922.
- 25 NUIGA, Papers of Michael Rynne, P133/4/7/23, extracts from private journal, 7 January 1922.
- 26 Hart, *Mick*, p. 356.
- 27 UCDA, Papers of Seán Mac Eoin, P151/131, 'Taking Over of Athlone Barracks', speech by Mac Eoin, February 1922.
- 28 *Dáil Debates*, S2, 26 April 1922.
- 29 *Irish Times*, 24 March 1922.
- 30 *Dáil Debates*, S2, 28 April 1922.
- 31 John O'Beirne-Ranelagh, 'The IRB from the Treaty to 1924', *Irish Historical Studies*, 20(77), March 1976, pp. 26–39.
- 32 John Borghonovo, 'Cumann na mBan in the Civil War', in Crowley et al. (eds.), *Atlas of the Irish Revolution*, pp. 698–703.

### 2: The Ulster Rock

- 1 Robert Lynch, *The Northern IRA and the Early Years of Partition, 1920–1922* (Dublin, 2006), p. 220.
- 2 Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), Cabinet Papers (CAB) 4/30, Draft conclusions of cabinet meeting, 26 January 1922.
- 3 PRONI, CAB 9A/4/1, Conference between chancellor of exchequer and Craig, 9 February 1922.
- 4 Ibid.